We introduce a family of logics for reasoning about relational evidence: evidence that involves an orderings of states in terms of their relative plausibility. We provide sound and complete axiomatizations for the logics. We also present several evidential actions and prove soundness and completeness for the associated dynamic logics.
Dynamic evidence logics [2, [17] [18] [19] [20] are logics for reasoning about the evidence and evidencebased beliefs of agents in a dynamic environment. Evidence logics are concerned with scenarios in which an agent collects several pieces of evidence about a situation of interest, from a number of sources, and uses this evidence to form and revise her beliefs about this situation. The agent is typically uncertain about the actual state of affairs, and as a result takes several alternative descriptions of this state as possible (these descriptions are typically called possible worlds or possible states). The existing evidence logics, i.e., neighborhood evidence logics (NEL) [2, [17] [18] [19] [20] , have the following features:
1. All evidence is 'binary'. Each piece of evidence is modeled as a set of possible states. This set indicates which states are good candidates for the actual state, and which ones are not, according to the source. Hence the name binary; every state is either a good candidate ('in'), or a bad candidate ('out'). 2. All evidence is equally reliable. The agent treats all evidence pieces on a par. There is no explicit modeling of the relative reliability of pieces of evidence. 3. One procedure to combine evidence. The logics developed so far study the evidence and beliefs held by an agent relying on one specific procedure for combining evidence.
This work presents a family of dynamic evidence logics which we call relational evidence logics (REL). Relational evidence logics aim to contribute to the existing work on evidence logic as follows.
1. Relax the assumption that all evidence is binary. This is accomplished by modeling pieces of evidence by evidence relations. Evidence relations are preorders over the set of possible states. The ordering is meant to represent the relative plausibility of states given an evidence item. While a special type of evidence relation -dichotomous weak order -can be used to represent binary evidence, less 'black-and-white' forms of evidence can also be encoded in REL models. 2. Model levels of evidence reliability. In general, not all evidence is equally reliable. Expert advice and gossip provide very different grounds for belief, and a rational agent should weight the evidence that it is exposed to accordingly. To model evidence reliability, we equipped our models with priority orders, i.e., orderings of the family of evidence relations according to their relative reliability. Priority orders were introduced in [1] , and have already been used in other DEL logics (see, e.g. [11, 14] ). Here, we use them to model the relative reliability of pieces of evidence.
Evidence aggregators. We are interested in modeling a situation in which an agent integrates evidence obtained from multiple sources to obtain and update a combined plausibility ordering, and forms beliefs based on this ordering. When we consider relational evidence with varying levels of priority, a natural way model the process of evidence combination is to define a function that takes as input a family of evidence orders R together with a priority order defined on them, and combines them into a plausibility order. The agent's beliefs can then be defined in terms of this output.
Definition 3 (Evidence aggregator). Let W be a set of alternatives. Let W be the set of preorders on W . An evidence aggregator for W is a function Ag mapping any preordered family P = R, to a preorder Ag(P ) on W , where ∅ ∈ R ⊆ W and is a preorder on R. R is seen here as a family of evidence orders over W , as a priority order for R, and Ag(P ) as an evidence-based plausibility order on W .
At first glance, our definition of an aggregator may seem to impose mild constraints that are met by most natural aggregation functions. However, as it is well-known, the output of some common rules, like the majority rule, may not be transitive (thus not a preorder), and hence they don't count as aggregators. A specific aggregator that does satisfy the constraints is the lexicographic rule. This aggregator was extensively studied in [1] , where it was shown to satisfy several nice aggregative properties. The definition of the aggregator is the following: Definition 4. The (anti-)lexicographic rule is the aggregator lex given by
Intuitively, the lexicographic rule works as follows. Given a particular hierarchy over a family of evidence R, aggregation is done by giving priority to the evidence orders further up the hierarchy in a compensating way: the agent follows what all evidence orders agree on, if it can, or follows more influential pieces of evidence, in case of disagreement. Other well-known aggregators that satisfy the constraints, but don't make use of the priority structure, are the intersection rule (defined below), or the Borda rule.
Definition 5. The intersection rule is the aggregator Ag ∩ given by (w, v) ∈ Ag ∩ ( R,
The models. Having defined relational evidence and evidence aggregators, we are now ready to introduce relational evidence models.
Definition 6 (Relational evidence model). Let P be a set of propositional variables. A relational evidence model (REL model, for short) is a tuple M = W, R, , V, Ag where W is a non-empty set of states; R, is an ordered family of evidence, where: R is a set of evidence orders on W with W 2 ∈ R and is a priority order for R; V : P → 2 W is a valuation function; Ag is an evidence aggregator for W . M = W, R, , V, Ag is said to be an f -model iff Ag = f . W 2 ∈ R is called the trivial evidence order. It represents the evidence stating that "the actual state is in W ". This evidence represents full uncertainty and is taken to be always available to the agent as a starting point.
Syntax and semantics. We now introduce a static language for reasoning about relational evidence, which we call L . In [2] , this language is interpreted over NEL models (there, the language is called L ∀ 0 ). Definition 7 (L ). Let P be a countably infinite set of propositional variables. The language L is defined by:
We define ⊥ := p ∧ ¬p and ⊤ := ¬⊥. The Boolean connectives ∨ and → are defined in terms of ¬ and ∧ in the usual manner. The duals of the modal operators are defined in the following way: ♦ 0 := ¬ 0 ¬, ♦ := ¬ ¬, ∃ := ¬∀¬.
The intended interpretation of the modalities is as follows. 0 ϕ reads as: 'the agent has basic, factive evidence for ϕ'; ϕ reads as: 'the agent has combined, factive evidence for ϕ'. The language L is interpreted over REL models as follows.
Aggregated (factive) evidence. We propose a notion of aggregated evidence based on the output of the aggregator: the agent has aggregated, factive evidence for ϕ at w ∈ W iff Ag( R, )[w] ⊆ ϕ M iff M, w |= ϕ. The non-factive version of the previous notion is as follows: the agent has aggregated evidence for ϕ (at any state) iff ∃w(Ag( R, )[w] ⊆ ϕ M ) iff M, w |= ∃ ϕ. As we did with basic evidence, we can define a conditional notion of aggregated evidence in ϕ by putting ϕ ψ := (ϕ → ψ). The unconditional version is given by ϕ = ⊤.
Evidence-based belief. The notion of belief we will work with is based on the agent's plausibility order, which in REL models corresponds to the output of the aggregator. As we don't require the plausibility order to be converse-well founded, it may have no maximal elements, which means that Grove's definition of belief may yield inconsistent beliefs. For this reason, we adopt a usual generalization of Grove's definition, which defines beliefs in terms of truth in all 'plausible enough' worlds (see, e.g., [3, 19] ). Putting Bϕ := ∀♦ ϕ, we have: the agent believes ϕ (at any state) iff ∀w(∃v((w, v) ∈ Ag( R, ) and Ag( R,
That is, the agent believes ϕ iff for every state w ∈ W , we can always find a more plausible state v ∈ ϕ M , all whose successors are also in ϕ M . When the plausibility relation is indeed converse well-founded, this notion of belief coincides with Grove's one, while ensuring consistency of belief otherwise. We can also define a notion of conditional belief. Putting B ϕ ψ := ∀(ϕ → ♦(ϕ → ( ϕ → ψ))), we have: 'the agent believes ψ conditional on ϕ iff
As before, this conditional notion reduces to that of absolute belief when ϕ = ⊤.
Example 1 (The diagnosis). Consider an agent seeking medical advice on an ongoing health issue. To keep thing simple, assume that there are four possible diseases: asthma (a), allergy (al), cold (c), and flu (f ). This can be described by a set W consisting of four possible worlds, {w a , w al , w c , w f } and a set of atomic formulas {a, al, c, f } (each true at the corresponding world). The agent consults three sources, a medical intern (IN ), a family doctor (F D) and an allergist (AL). The doctors inspect the patient, observing fairly non-specific symptoms: cough, no fever, and some inconclusive swelling at an allergen test spot. Given the non-specificity of the symptoms, the doctors can't single out a condition that best explains all they observed. Instead, comparing the diseases in terms of how well they explain the observed symptoms and drawing on their experience, each doctor arrives at a ranking of the possible diseases. Let us denote by R IN , R F D and R AL the evidence orders representing the judgment of the intern, family doctor and allergist, respectively, which we assume to be as depicted below. If the agent has no information about how reliable each doctor is, she may just trust them all equally. We can model this by a priority order over the evidence orders R IN ∼ R F D ∼ R AL that puts all evidence as equally likely. On the other hand, if the agent knows that the intern is the least experienced of the doctors, she may give consider his evidence as strictly less reliable than the one provided by the other doctors. Similarly, if allergist has a very strong reputation, the agent may wish to give the allergist's judgment strict priority over the rest. We can model this by a different priority order ′ given by R IN ≺ ′ R F D ≺ ′ R AL (note that this is meant to be reflexive and transitive). If, e.g., the agent uses the lexicographic rule, we arrive at the following scenarios, with different aggregated evidence depending on the priority order used:
A PDL language for relational evidence Later in this work, we will discuss evidential actions by which the agent, upon receiving a new piece of relational evidence, revises its existing body of evidence. To encode syntactically the evidence pieces featured in evidential actions, we will enrich our basic language L with formulas that stand for specific evidence relations. A natural way to introduce relation-defining expressions, in a modal setting such as ours, is to employ suitable program expressions from Propositional Dynamic Logic (PDL). We will follow this approach, augmenting L with PDL-style evidence programs that define pieces of relational evidence. As evidence orders are preorders, we will employ a set of program expressions whose terms are guaranteed to always define preorders. An natural fragment of PDL meeting this condition is the one provided by programs of the form π * , which always define the reflexive transitive closure of some relation.
Definition 10 (Evidence programs). The set Π has all program symbols π defined as follows:
Here A denotes the universal program, while the rest of the programs have their usual PDL meanings (see, e.g., [12] ). We call Π * := {π * | π ∈ Π} the set of evidence programs.
To interpret evidence programs in REL models, we extend the truth map · M as follows:
Some examples of definable evidence programs. Here are some natural types of relational evidence that can be constructed with programs from Π * .
Dichotomous evidence. For a formula ϕ, let π ϕ := (A; ?ϕ) ∪ (?¬ϕ; A; ?¬ϕ). π ϕ puts the ϕ worlds strictly above the ¬ϕ worlds, and makes every world equally plausible within each of these two regions. It is easy to see that π ϕ always defines a preorder, and therefore (π ϕ ) * is an evidence program equivalent to π ϕ . ¬ϕ ϕ Fig. 1 . The dichotomous order defined by πϕ.
Totally ordered evidence. Several programs can be used to define total orders. For example, for formulas ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n , we can define the program This type of program, described in [22] , puts the ϕ 1 worlds above everything else, the ¬ϕ 1 ∧ ϕ 2 worlds above the ¬ϕ 1 ∧ ¬ϕ 2 worlds, and so on, and the ¬ϕ 1 ∧ ¬ϕ 2 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬ϕ n−1 ∧ ϕ n above the ¬ϕ 1 ∧ ¬ϕ 2 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬ϕ n worlds. π t (ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n ) always defines a preorder, so the evidence program (π t (ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n )) * is equivalent to it.
¬ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬ϕn ¬ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬ϕn−1 ∧ ϕn ¬ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ϕ1 . . . Fig. 2 . The total order defined by π t (ϕ1, . . . , ϕn).
Partially ordered evidence. Several programs can be used to define evidence orders featuring incomparabilities. To illustrate this, let us consider the program π ϕ∧ψ := (A; ?ϕ ∧ ψ) ∪ (?¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ; A; ?ϕ ∨ ψ) ∪ (?¬ϕ ∧ ψ; A; ?¬ϕ ∧ ψ) ∪ (?ϕ ∧ ¬ψ; A; ?ϕ ∧ ¬ψ). As depicted in Figure 3 , this program puts the ϕ ∧ ψ worlds above everything else, the ¬ϕ ∧ ψ and ϕ ∧ ¬ψ as incomparable 'second-best' worlds, and the ¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ below everything else. As with the other programs π ϕ∧ψ always defines a preorder, so (π ϕ∧ψ ) * is an equivalent evidence program. Normal form programs We now introduce a 'normal form' lemma for the programs in Π. This lemma shows that, for any evidence program π ∈ Π, we can find another program π ′ ∈ Π, which is a union of certain programs, and which is equivalent to π. Of special interest for us is the normal form established for programs of the shape π * . The fact that every evidence program π * is equivalent to a program with a specific syntactic shape is used extensively in the completeness proofs for dynamic extensions of L discussed later on. We first introduce some notation and necessary definitions: Notation 1. For π 1 , . . . , π n ∈ Π we write n i=1 π i to denote the program π 1 ∪ · · · ∪ π n . We denote the set of all finite sequences of elements of a set X by S 0 (X). Moreover, we denote by len(s) the length of a sequence s = (s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s len(s) ) and by s|s ′ the concatenation of sequences s and s ′ .
Definition 12 (Program equivalence). Two programs π, π ′ ∈ Π are equivalent iff for every REL model M , π M = π ′ M . Definition 13 (Normal form). A normal form for a program π ∈ Π is a program π ′ ∈ Π such that (1) π ′ has the form i∈I (?ϕ i ; A; ?ψ i ) ∪ (?θ), where ϕ i , ψ i , θ ∈ L and I is a finite index set; and (2) π and π ′ are equivalent.
The proofs for the following lemma, as well as the other results presented in this paper, can be found in the 'Proofs Appendix' at the end of the paper.
Lemma 1 (Normal Form Lemma) Given any program π ∈ Π, we can find a normal form π ′ for it. In particular, the normal form for program π * , where π has a normal form
As the normal form for * -programs is a rather long program, we will generally use the following abbreviation to ease reading. Notation 2. Let I be an index set. Let s ∈ S 0 (I) be a sequence. We will use the following abbreviation: s(ϕ, ψ) := (ϕ s1 ∧ len(s) k=2 (∃(ψ s k−1 ∧ϕ s k ))). With this abbreviation, the union normal form for * -programs will be written as s∈S0(I) ?s(ϕ, ψ); A; ?ψ s len(s) ) ∪ (?⊤).
The Logics of Ag ∩ -Models and lex-Models
Static logics. We initiate here our logical study of the statics of belief and evidence in the REL setting. We first zoom into two specific classes of REL models, the classes of Ag ∩ -models and lex-models, and study the static logics for belief and evidence based on these models. In particular, we introduce systems L ∩ and L lex that axiomatize the class of Ag ∩ -models and the class of lex-models, respectively. (To simplify notation, we write ∩-models instead of Ag ∩ -models hereafter). In later sections, after extending our basic static language appropriately, we will 'zoom out' and study the class of all REL models. Our decision to study ∩ and lex models in some detail is as follows. The class of ∩-models is interesting because it links our relational evidence setting back to the NEL setting that inspired it. Indeed, as we show below, given any NEL model with finitely many pieces of evidence, we can always find a ∩-model that is modally equivalent to it (with respect to language L ). This ∩-model represents binary evidence in a relational way, thereby encoding the same information present in the NEL model. lex-models, on the other hand, provide a good study case for the REL setting, as they exemplify its main novel features: nonbinary evidence and reliability-sensitive aggregation. We start by recalling the definition of a NEL model. The definition of these models follows the one in [2] . For a more general notion, see [18] , where the models we consider are called uniform models.
Definition 14 (Neighborhood evidence model). A neighborhood evidence model is a tuple M = W, E 0 , V where: W is a non-empty set of states; E 0 ⊆ P(W ) is a family of evidence sets, such that ∅ ∈ E 0 and W ∈ E 0 ; V : P → P(W ) is a valuation function. A model is called feasible if E 0 is finite.
Definition 15 (Satisfaction). Let M = W, E 0 , V be an NEL model and w ∈ W . The satisfaction relation |= between pairs (M, w) and formulas ϕ ∈ L is:
We now present a way to 'transform' a NEL model into a matching REL model. To do that, we first encode binary evidence, the type of evidence considered in NEL models, as relational evidence.
Definition 16. Let W be a set. For each e ⊆ W , we denote by R e the relation given by:
That is, R e is a preorder with at most two indifference classes (i.e., a dichotomous weak order) of 'good' and 'bad' candidates for the actual state, which puts all the 'bad' candidates strictly below the 'good' ones. Having fixed this connection evidence sets and evidence orders, we can now consider a natural way to transform every NEL into a ∩-model in which each evidence order is dichotomous. To fix this connection, we define a mapping between NEL and REL models.
Definition 17. Let Rel be a map from NEL to REL models given by:
We can then observe that feasible NEL models and their images under Rel are modally equivalent, in the sense of having point-wise equivalent modal theories.
That is, feasible NEL models can be seen as 'special cases' of REL models in which all evidence is dichotomous and equally reliable. As the following proposition shows, the modal equivalence result does not extend to non-feasible NEL models. This is because, in models with infinitely many pieces of evidence, the notion of combined evidence presented in [2] differs from the one proposed here for REL models. To clarify this, consider a NEL model M = W, E 0 , V . Recall that the agent has combined evidence for a proposition ϕ at w if there is a finite body of evidence whose combination contains w and supports ϕ, i.e., if there is some finite
That is, the combination of all the evidence supports ϕ at w, but no combination of a finite subfamily of E 0 does. In a NEL model like this, the agent does not have combined evidence for ϕ at w. That is, M, w |= ϕ. However, our proposed notion of aggregated evidence for REL models is based on combining all the available evidence, and as a result in Rel(M ) the agent does have aggregated evidence for ϕ (i.e., Rel(M ), w |= ϕ). Proposition 2 Non-feasible NEL models need not be modally equivalent to their images under Rel. In particular, the left-to-right direction of Proposition 1 holds for non-feasible evidence models, but the right-to-left direction doesn't: there are non-feasible neighborhood models M s.t.
Having motivated our interest in ∩-models via their connection to neighborhood evidence logics, we now focus again on the static logics of ∩and lex-models. Table 1 lists the axioms and rules in L ∩ and L lex .
Theorem 1 L ∩ and L lex are sound and strongly complete with respect to ∩-models and lexmodels, respectively. Evidence dynamics for ∩-models. Having established the soundness and completeness of the static logics, we now turn to evidence dynamics, starting with ∩-models. In line with the work on NEL, we consider update, evidence addition and evidence upgrade actions for ∩-models. As the intersection rule is insensitive to the priority order, when we consider ∩-models, it is convenient to treat the models as if they came with a family of evidence orders R only, instead of an ordered family R, . Accordingly, hereafter we will write ∩-models as follows: M = W, R, V, Ag ∩ . Throughout this section, we fix a ∩-model M = W, R, V, Ag ∩ , some proposition P ⊆ W and some evidence order R ∈ P re(W ).
Update. We first consider updates that involve learning a new fact P with absolute certainty. Upon learning P , the agent rules out all possible states that are incompatible with it. For REL models, this means keeping only the worlds in P M and restricting each evidence order accordingly.
Definition 18 (Update). The model M !P = W !P , R !P , V !P , Ag !P ∩ has W !P := P , R !P := {R ∩ P 2 | R ∈ R}, Ag !P ∩ := Ag ∩ restricted to P , and for all p ∈ P, V !P (p) := V (p) ∩ P . Evidence addition. Unlike update, which is standardly defined in terms of an incoming proposition P ⊆ W , our proposed notion of evidence addition for ∩-models involves accepting a new piece of relational evidence R from a trusted source. That is, relational evidence addition consists of adding a new piece of relational evidence R ⊆ P re(W ) to the family R.
Evidence upgrade. Finally, we consider an action of upgrade with a piece of relational evidence R. This upgrade action is based on the notion of binary lexicographic merge from Andréka et. al. [1] .
Intuitively, this operation modifies each existing piece of evidence R ′ with R following the rule: "keep whatever R and R ′ agree on, and where they conflict, give priority to R". To encode syntactically the evidential actions described above, we present extensions of L , obtained by adding to L dynamic modalities for update, evidence addition and evidence upgrade. The modalities for update will be standard, i.e., modalities of the form [!ϕ]ψ. The new formulas of the form [!ϕ]ψ are used to express the statement: "ψ is true after ϕ is publicly announced".
Definition 21 (L ! ). The language L ! is defined recursively by:
For the remaining actions, we extend L with dynamic modalities of the form [+π]ψ for addition and [⇑ π]ψ for upgrade, where the symbol π occurring inside the modality is an evidence program.
The new formulas of the form [+π]ϕ are used to express the statement: "ϕ is true after the evidence order defined by π is added as a piece of evidence", while the [⇑ π]ϕ are used to express: "ϕ is true after the existing evidence is upgraded with the relation defined by π". We extend the satisfaction relation |= to cover formulas of the form [•π]ϕ as follows:
We now introduce proof systems whose logics are sound and complete with respect to ∩models. The soundness and completeness proofs work via a standard reductive analysis, appealing to reduction axioms. We refer to [13] for an extensive explanation of this technique.
Definition 25 (L ! , L + and L ⇑ ). The proof system L ! extends L with the following reduction axioms:
Let π be an evidence program with normal form s∈S0(I) ?s(ϕ, ψ); A; ?ψ s len(s) ∪ (?⊤). The proof system L + extends L with the following reduction axioms:
The proof system L ⇑ extends L with the following reduction axioms:
where the formulas π < (χ) and π ∩ (χ) in EU 4 ∩ and EU 5 ∩ are given by:
Theorem 2 L ! , L + and L ⇑ are sound and complete with respect to ∩-models.
Evidence dynamics for lex-models. We now have a first look at the dynamics of evidence over lex models. In the REL setting, evidential actions can be seen as complex actions involving two possible transformations on the initial model: (i) modifying the stock of evidence, R, perhaps by adding a new evidence relation R to it, or modifying the existing evidence with R; and (ii) updating the priority order, , e.g. to 'place' a new evidence item where it fits, according to its reliability. We may also have actions involving evidence, not about the world, but about evidence itself or its sources (sometimes called 'higher-order evidence' [8] ), which trigger a reevaluation of the priority order without changing the stock of evidence (for instance, upon learning that a specific source is less reliable than we initially thought, we may want to lower the priority of the evidence provided by this source). To illustrate the type of actions that can be explored in this setting, here we study an action of prioritized addition over lex models. For the sake of generality, we describe this action over REL models. 
To encode prioritized addition, we add formulas of the form [⊕π]ϕ, used to express the statement that ϕ is true after the prioritized addition of the evidence order defined by π.
Definition 27 (L ⊕ ). The language L ⊕ is given by:
As we did with the dynamic extensions presented for actions in ∩-models, we wish to obtain a matching proof system for our dynamic language L ⊕ . We do this via reduction axioms. Before presenting the proof system L ⊕ , we introduce some abbreviations that will be used in the definition of these axioms.
Notation 3. Let π be a normal form π := s∈S0(I) ?s(ϕ, ψ); A; ?ψ s len(s) ∪ (?⊤). For a formula [⊕π]χ, we define the following abbreviations:
Definition 29 (L ⊕ ). Let χ, χ ′ ∈ L ⊕ and let π ∈ Π * be an evidence program with normal form s∈S0(I) (?s(ϕ, ψ); A; ?ψ s len(s) ) ∪ (?⊤). The proof system L ⊕ extends L 0 with the following reduction axioms:
Theorem 3 L ⊕ is sound and strongly complete with respect to lex models.
The Logic of REL Models
In this section, we study the logic of evidence and belief based on some abstract aggregator. That is, instead of fixing an aggregator, we are now interested in reasoning about the beliefs that an agent would form, based on her evidence, irrespective of the aggregator used. With respect to dynamics, we will focus on the action of prioritized addition introduced for lex-models, considering an iterated version of prioritized addition, defined with a (possibly empty) sequence of evidence orders R = R 1 , . . . , R n as input.
Definition 30 (Iterated prioritized addition). Let M = W, R, , V, Ag be a REL model and R = R 1 , . . . , R n be a sequence of evidence orders.The model
That is, first R 1 is added as the highest priority evidence, then R 2 is added as the highest priority evidence, on top of every other evidence (including R 1 ), and so on, up to R n . Naturally, when R has one element, we are back to the basic notion of prioritized addition.
Syntax and semantics. To pre-encode part of the dynamics of iterated prioritized addition, we will modify our basic language L with conditional aggregated evidence modalities of the form π , where π is a finite, possibly empty sequence of evidence programs π 1 , . . . , π n (i.e., π i ∈ Π * , for i ∈ {1, . . . n}). The intended interpretation of π ϕ is "the agent would have aggregated evidence for ϕ, if she performed the iterated prioritized addition of the evidence orders defined by π".
Definition 31 (L c ). The language L c is defined as follows:
where π is a (possibly empty) finite sequence of evidence programs (i.e. * -programs).
As we allow π to be empty, π reduces to the ϕ from L when π is the empty sequence, giving us a fully static sub-language. Notation 4. We abuse the notation for the truth map · M and write π M to denote π 1 M , . . . , π n M , where π = π 1 , . . . , π n .
Satisfaction for formulas π ϕ ∈ L c is given as follows.
Definition 32. Let M = W, R, , V, Ag be an REL model and w ∈ W . The satisfaction relation |= between pairs (M, w) and formulas π ϕ ∈ L c is defined as follows:
That is, π ϕ is true at a state w if the agent would have aggregated evidence for ϕ, assuming that the current ordered body of evidence is transformed by the iterated prioritized addition of π M . Note that, as we allow π to be empty, π reduces to the standard ϕ from L when π is the empty sequence.
Static logic. Next, we introduce a complete proof system for the language with conditional modalities.
Definition 33 (L c ). The system L c includes the same axioms and inference rules as L lex , with axioms and inference rules for in L lex applying to π in L c .
Theorem 4 L c is sound and strongly complete with respect to REL models.
Evidence dynamics for REL models. Having established the soundness and completeness of the static logic, we now turn to evidence dynamics, focusing on prioritized evidence addition. To encode prioritized addition, we add formulas of the form [⊕π]ϕ, used to express the statement that ϕ is true after the prioritized addition of the sequence of evidence orders defined by π.
Definition 34 (L ⊕ c ). The language L ⊕ c is given by:
where π is a (possibly empty) finite sequence of evidence programs (i.e. * -programs). 
Having fixed our dynamic language, we now present reduction axioms for it.
Definition 36 (L ⊕ c ). Let χ, χ ′ ∈ L ⊕ π and let π = π 1 , . . . , π n ∈ S 0 (Π * ) be a sequence of evidence programs where each π i has a normal form π i := s∈S0(Ii) (?s(ϕ, ψ); A; ?ψ s len(s) ) ∪ (?⊤).
The proof system L ⊕ c includes all axioms schemas and inference rules of L c , together with the following reduction axioms:
where πρ denotes the concatenation of the sequences π and ρ.
Theorem 5 L ⊕ c is sound and complete with respect to REL models.
Conclusions and Future Work
We have presented evidence logics that use a novel representation for evidence and incorporate reliability-sensitive forms of evidence aggregation. Clearly, many open problems remain. Here are a few more specific avenues for future research:
-Additional aggregators: We studied two natural aggregators. As we know from the social choice literature, many other aggregators have nice properties. An interesting extension to this work could involve developing logics based on other well-known aggregators. -Additional evidential actions: As we saw, in a setting with ordered evidence, evidence actions are complex transformations, both of the stock of evidence and the priority order. For the lexicographic case, we studied a form of prioritized addition. It could be interesting to consider more general forms of addition, or actions that transform the priority order (re-evaluation of reliability) without affecting the stock of evidence. -Probabilistic evidence: We moved from the binary evidence case to the relational evidence case. Another important form of evidence is probabilistic evidence, i.e., evidence that comes in the form of a probability distribution over the set of states. The aggregation of probability functions is studied in probabilistic opinion pooling [9] and pure inductive logic [15] , but a dynamic-logic study has yet to be developed.
PROOFS APPENDIX
PROOF OF PROPOSITIONS 1 AND 2
Proof. By induction on the structure of ϕ. The base case for ϕ = p (p ∈ P) and the inductive step for ϕ = ¬ψ,ϕ = ψ ∧ χ and ϕ = ∀ψ are shown by unfolding the definitions. We show now the cases involving 0 and modalities.
ϕ = 0 ψ. Note that:
Proposition 2 Non-feasible NEL models need not be modally equivalent to their images under Rel. In particular, the left-to-right direction of Proposition 1 holds for non-feasible evidence models, but the right-to-left direction doesn't: there are non-feasible neighborhood models M s.t.
Proof. That the left-to-right direct holds is clear from the fact that the proofs for this direction don't depend on the cardinality of E 0 . For the right-to-left direction, the following is a counterex-
Note that for all e ∈ E, e ⊆ p M and thus M, 0 |= p. Moreover, we have:
And as 0 ∈ e for all e ∈ E 0 , by the fact that 0 ∈ e implies R e [0] = e, we have R e [0] = e for each e ∈ E 0 . Hence 
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
The following well-known results about relational composition will be used in the normal form lemma. Proposition 3 Relational composition distributes over arbitrary unions. That is, for any binary relation R and any indexed family of binary relations Q i :
Proof. See, e.g., [12, 8] .
The following standard PDL facts will also be used. Proposition 4 Let M be a REL model. Then:
In the step of the normal form lemma concerning * -programs, we will make use of the following definitions and results.
Definition 37 (Walks and paths).
A path is a walk in which all vertices are distinct (except possibly the first and last). A wv-walk is a walk with first vertex w and last vertex v. A wv-path is defined similarly. The length of a walk (path) is its number of edges. Proof. This is a standard result. For a proof, see, e.g., [16, 19] . Proof. Straightforward.
After fixing the auxiliary results, we get to the proof of Lemma 1.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of π. Let M be any REL model.
π = A. Let π ′ be the union form π ′ := (?⊤; A; ?⊤) ∪ (?⊥). It is straightforward to check that π ′ and π are equivalent.
π =?ϕ. Let π ′ be the union form π ′ := (?⊥; A; ?⊥) ∪ (?ϕ). Again, it is straightforward to check that π ′ and π are equivalent. -π = π 1 ∪ π 2 . By induction hypothesis, we can find normal forms for π 1 and π 2 . Let the forms be π ′ 1 := i∈I (?ϕ i ; A; ?ψ i )∪?θ and π ′ 2 := j∈J (?ϕ j ; A; ?ψ j )∪?θ ′ respectively. Let π ′ be the union form π ′ := ( k∈I∪J ?ϕ k ; A; ?ψ k ) ∪ (?θ ∨ θ ′ ). Again, it is straightforward to check that π ′ and π are equivalent. -π = π 1 ; π 2 . By induction hypothesis, we can find normal forms for π 1 and π 2 . Let the forms be π ′ 1 := i∈I ?(ϕ i ; A; ?ψ i )∪?θ and π ′ 2 := j∈J (?ϕ j ; A; ?ψ j )∪?θ ′ respectively. It is not difficult to transform π into a normal form shape, essentially using (several times) the fact that composition distributes over union (proposition 3) to pull the big unions to the left side of the program, and re-indexing the formulas appropriately.
π = π * 1 . By induction hypothesis, we can find a normal form for π 1 . Let this normal form be π ′ 1 := i∈I (?ϕ i ; A; ?ψ i )∪?θ. We recall here that S 0 (I) denotes the set of all finite sequences of elements from I, and len(s) denotes the length of sequence s = (s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s len(s) ). Let π ′ be the union form:
We will show that π ′ is a normal form for π. Observe that:
iff there is an xy-walk along We recall the theorem:
Theorem 1 L ∩ and L lex are sound and strongly complete with respect to ∩-models and lexmodels, respectively.
We prove the soundness and completeness of L ∩ and L lex separately.
Soundness and completeness of L ∩ . The soundness proof is straightforward; it suffices to check that each axiom is valid and that the inference rules preserve truth. We focus on the completeness proof. The completeness of L w.r.t ∩-models follows from Proposition 1 and the fact that L is complete, and has the finite model property, w.r.t NEL models (a result from [2] ). We recall Proposition 1. Next, we recall a result proven in [2] : Theorem 6, [2] . L is sound, strongly complete and has the finite model property with respect to the class of NEL models.
The theorem above, together with the fact that feasible NEL models are modally equivalent to their images under Rel, gives us the completeness of L w.r.t ∩-models.
Claim. L is complete w.r.t ∩-models.
Proof. As indicated, e.g., in [6, [194] [195] , a logic Λ is strongly complete with respect to a class of models iff every Λ-consistent set of formulas is satisfiable on some model in this class. Hence, it suffices to show that every L-consistent set of formulas is satisfiable on some ∩-model. Let Γ be an L-consistent set of formulas. As L is complete and has the finite model property with respect to NEL models, there is a finite (and hence feasible) NEL model M and a state w in M such that M, w |= ϕ for all ϕ ∈ Γ . By proposition 1, we have Rel(M ), w |= ϕ for all ϕ ∈ Γ . Thus, Γ is satisfiable on a ∩-model.
Soundness and completeness of L lex . The soundness proof is straightforward; we focus on completeness. The approach to the proof is similar to the one used by Fagin et. al. [10] to prove completeness for the logic of distributed knowledge. Before going into the details of the proof, we give an outline of the main steps in it.
1.
Step 1: Completeness of L lex with respect to pre-models. First, we define a specific type of canonical REL model for each L lex -consistent theory T 0 , which we call a pre-model for T 0 . Then we prove completeness of L lex via canonical pre-models. 2.
Step 2: Unraveling. In the second step, we unravel the canonical pre-model for T 0 (see Chapter 4.5 in [6] for details about this technique). This involves creating all possible histories in the pre-model rooted at T 0 . The histories are the paths of the canonical pre-model that start at T 0 . These histories are related in such a way that they form a tree. 3.
Step 3: Completeness of L lex with respect to lex models. In the third step, we take the tree we just constructed, and from we define a lex model for T 0 . Then we define a variant of a bounded morphism between the canonical pre-model and the lex model generated from the tree, which makes completeness with respect to those models immediate.
Step 1: Completeness with respect to pre-models. We build a canonical pre-model for each L lex -consistent set of formulas T 0 . We first fix a standard lemma.
Lemma 1 (Lindenbaum's Lemma). Every consistent set of formulas of L can be extended to a maximally consistent one.
Proof. The proof is a special case of [6, 197] .
We recall some properties of maximally consistent sets: Proposition 1. Let T 0 be a maximally consistent set. The following hold:
Proof. The proofs are all standard. See, e.g., [7, 53] .
We now define the notion of a canonical pre-model that we will use in the completeness proof of Step 1.
Definition 38 (Canonical pre-model for T 0 ). Let T 0 be a L lex -consistent set of formulas. A canonical pre-model for T 0 is a structure M c = W c , R c , c , V c , Ag c with:
-Ag c is an aggregator for W c given by 
We first need to show that this canonical pre-model is indeed a REL model.
Proof. In order to show that M c is an REL model, we have to show that:
1. R c is a family of evidence, i.e., every R ∈ R is a preorder.
R is a preorder, and thus Ag c is well-defined.
For item 1, let ϕ ∈ L be arbitrary. Let R ∈ R be arbitrary. Then either R = R ′ or R = R 0ϕ for some ϕ. As R ′ is the reflexive transitive closure of the relation R ∪ {(T, F (T, ϕ)) | T ∈ W c and ϕ ∈ L }, it is a preorder, as required. Now consider R = R 0ϕ for some ϕ. The reflexivity of R is immediate from the definition of R 0ϕ . For the transitivity, let T, S, U ∈ M c and suppose that R 0ϕ T S and R 0ϕ SU . Either 0 ϕ ∈ T or 0 ϕ ∈ T . Note that, by definition of R 0ϕ , if 0 ϕ ∈ T , then R 0ϕ [T ] = W c and thus R 0ϕ T U . Suppose now that 0 ϕ ∈ T . Then by definition of R 0ϕ , given R 0ϕ T S we have 0 ϕ ∈ S, and thus as R 0ϕ SU we get 0 ϕ ∈ U , which implies R 0ϕ T U . For item 2, observe that N , i.e., 0 ⊤, is an axiom of our system. Thus it is a member of any maximal consistent set, which implies that R 0⊤ = W c × W c . Now we consider item 3. For reflexivity, suppose that ( ϕ) ∈ T for some T ∈ M c . As T is an axiom and T is maximal consistent, ( ϕ → ϕ) ∈ T . As ( ϕ) ∈ T and T is closed under modus ponens, we have ϕ ∈ T . Thus R T T . For transitivity, let T, S, U ∈ M c and suppose that R T S and R SU . Suppose ( ϕ) ∈ T . As 4 is an axiom and T is maximally consistent, ( ϕ → ϕ) ∈ T . As ( ϕ) ∈ T and T is closed under modus ponens, we have ϕ ∈ T . As R T S, we then have ϕ ∈ S. Hence, as R SU , we have ϕ ∈ U . As ϕ was arbitrary, this holds for each ϕ and hence we have R T U .
Having established that M c is a REL model, we prove now the standard lemmas to show that the canonical pre-model works as expected. Proof. (⇒). Assume T ∈ ∃ϕ , i.e., (∃ϕ) ∈ T ∈ W c . We first prove the following:
Claim. The set Γ := {∀ψ | (∀ψ) ∈ T } ∪ {ϕ} is consistent.
Proof. Suppose that Γ is inconsistent, i.e., Γ ⊢ L lex ⊥. Then there are finitely many sentences ∀ψ 1 , . . . , ∀ψ n ∈ T such that ⊢ L lex ∀ψ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ∀ψ n → ¬ϕ. By Necessitation for ∀ we have ⊢ L lex ∀(∀ψ ∧ · · · ∧ ∀ψ n → ¬ϕ) and from this, by K ∀ and modus ponens we get ⊢ L lex ∀(∀ψ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ∀ψ n ) → ∀¬ϕ. The system S5 has the theorem ⊢ L lex (∀∀ψ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ∀∀ψ n ) → ∀(∀ψ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ∀ψ n ) (see, e.g., [7, 20] ). Hence by propositional logic we have ⊢ L lex (∀∀ψ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ∀∀ψ n ) → ∀¬ϕ. Given 4 ∀ we have ⊢ L lex ∀ψ 1 → ∀∀ψ 1 , . . . , ⊢ L lex ∀ψ n → ∀∀ψ n , which by propositional logic implies ⊢ L lex (∀ψ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ∀ψ n ) → ∀∀ψ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ∀∀ψ n . Thus we have ⊢ L lex (∀ψ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ∀ψ n ) → ∀¬ϕ. Hence as T is maximal consistent and closed under modus ponens, we get (∀¬ϕ) ∈ T . But we also have (∃ϕ) ∈ T , i.e., (¬∀¬ϕ) ∈ T , and since T is maximal consistent, this means that (∀¬ϕ) ∈ T . Contradiction.
Given the Claim, by Lindenbaum's Lemma, there is some maximally consistent theory S such that Γ ⊆ S. As ϕ ∈ Γ we have ϕ ∈ S. Moreover, as {∀ψ | (∀ψ) ∈ T } ⊆ {∀χ | (∀χ) ∈ S} we have R ∀ T S. As T ∈ W c , we also have R ∀ T 0 T . That is, {∀θ | (∀θ) ∈ T 0 } ⊆ {∀ψ | (∀ψ) ∈ T }. Thus {∀θ | (∀θ) ∈ T 0 } ⊆ {∀χ | (∀χ) ∈ S} and thus R ∀ T 0 S. Hence S ∈ W c , which together with ϕ ∈ S gives us S ∈ ϕ .
(⇐) Assume T ∈ ϕ , i.e., ϕ ∈ T . Given T ∀ we have ⊢ L lex ∀¬ϕ → ¬ϕ, and by contraposition we get ⊢ L lex ¬¬ϕ → ¬∀¬ϕ, i.e., ⊢ L lex ϕ → ∃ϕ. Hence (ϕ → ∃ϕ) ∈ T and as T is closed under modus ponens, given also ϕ ∈ T we get (∃ϕ) ∈ T , i.e., T ∈ ∃ϕ .
Lemma 3 (Existence Lemma for ). T ∈ ♦ϕ iff there is an S ∈ ϕ such that R T S.
Proof. (⇒). Assume T ∈ ♦ϕ , i.e., ♦ϕ ∈ T ∈ W c . We first prove the following:
Proof. Suppose that Γ is inconsistent. Then there is a finite Γ 0 ⊆ Γ such that Γ 0 ⊢ L lex ⊥. By the theorems ⊢ L lex (ψ i1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψ in ) ↔ ( ψ i1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψ in ) and ⊢ L lex ∀(θ j1 ∧ · · · ∧ θ jn ) ↔ (∀θ j1 ∧ · · · ∧ ∀θ jn ) we can assume that Γ 0 = { ψ, ∀θ, ¬ϕ} for some ψ, ∀θ ∈ T . That is, we have ⊢ L lex ψ ∧ ∀θ → ¬ϕ. By Necessitation for we obtain ⊢ L lex ( ψ ∧ ∀θ → ¬ϕ). From this, by K we get ⊢ L lex ( ψ ∧ ∀θ) → ¬ϕ. By the theorem ⊢ L lex ( ψ ∧ ∀θ) ↔ ( ψ ∧ ∀θ), from propositional logic we get ⊢ L lex ( ψ ∧ ∀θ) → ¬ϕ. Given the axioms in our system we have ⊢ L lex ψ → ψ and ⊢ L lex ∀(∀θ) → (∀θ). Using these, by propositional logic we obtain ⊢ L lex ( ψ ∧ ∀∀θ) → ¬ϕ. Given our axioms, we also have ⊢ L lex ∀θ → ∀∀θ. Hence by propositional logic we get ⊢ L lex ( ψ ∧ ∀θ) → ¬ϕ. As ψ, ∀θ ∈ T and T is closed under modus ponens, we get ( ¬ϕ) ∈ T . But we also have (♦ϕ) ∈ T , i.e., (¬ ¬ϕ) ∈ T , and since T is maximal consistent, this means that ( ¬ϕ) ∈ T . Contradiction.
Given the Claim, by Lindenbaum's Lemma, there is some maximally consistent theory S such that Γ ⊆ S. As ϕ ∈ Γ we have ϕ ∈ S. Moreover, as {ψ | ( ψ) ∈ T } ⊆ S, we have R T S. Additionally, we have {∀θ | (∀θ) ∈ T 0 } ⊆ S and thus R ∀ T 0 S. Hence S ∈ W c , which together with ϕ ∈ S gives us S ∈ ϕ .
(⇐) Assume T ∈ ϕ , i.e., ϕ ∈ T . Given T we have ⊢ L lex ¬ϕ → ¬ϕ, and by contraposition we get ⊢ L lex ¬¬ϕ → ¬ ¬ϕ, i.e., ⊢ L lex ϕ → ♦ϕ. Hence, (ϕ → ♦ϕ) ∈ T and as T is closed under modus ponens, given also ϕ ∈ T we get (♦ϕ) ∈ T , i.e., T ∈ ♦ϕ .
Lemma 4 (Existence Lemma for
Proof. (⇒). Assume T ∈ 0 ϕ , i.e., ( 0 ϕ) ∈ T ∈ W c . We first prove the following:
As T is closed under modus ponens, given
Hence R 0ϕ ∈ R c . We will show that R 0ϕ [T ] ⊆ ϕ . Let S ∈ W c be arbitrary and suppose that R 0ϕ T S. By definition of R 0ϕ , we have ( 0 ϕ) ∈ T implies ( 0 ϕ) ∈ S. As ( 0 ϕ) ∈ T we get ( 0 ϕ) ∈ S. Given T 0 we have ⊢ L lex 0 ϕ → ϕ and thus ( 0 ϕ → ϕ) ∈ S. Since S is closed under modus ponens we thus get ϕ ∈ S, i.e., S ∈ ϕ . As S was picked arbitrarily, we have
We first consider the case (i), i.e., R = R ′ . We need to show that T ∈ 0 ϕ . Suppose not, i.e., 0 ϕ ∈ T . Recall that, given the definition of F : W c × L → W c , given that ( 0 ϕ) ∈ T , we have F (T, ϕ) = S for some theory S ∈ W c such that ϕ ∈ S. Moreover, R ′ is the reflexive transitive closure of the relation R ∪ {(T, F (T, ϕ)) | T ∈ W c and ϕ ∈ L }. Hence (T, S) ∈ {(T, F (T, ϕ)) | T ∈ W c and ϕ ∈ L } and thus (T, S) ∈ R ′ . But then, as S ∈ W c and ϕ ∈ S, we have S ∈ ϕ . This implies R ′ [T ] ⊆ ϕ , contradicting our assumption to the contrary.
We now consider case (ii), i.e., R = R 0θ for some θ ∈ L such that (∃ 0 θ) ∈ T 0 . Either 0 θ ∈ T or 0 θ ∈ T . We consider both cases.
Case 1: Suppose that 0 θ ∈ T ∈ W c . We first prove the following:
i.e., ⊢ L lex ( 0 θ ∧ ∀ψ) → (¬¬ϕ), i.e., ⊢ L lex ( 0 θ ∧ ∀ψ) → ϕ. Given the Pullout axiom, we have ⊢ L lex 0 (θ ∧ ∀ψ) → ( 0 θ ∧ ∀ψ) and thus ⊢ L lex 0 (θ ∧ ∀ψ) → ϕ. By the Monotonicity Rule for 0 , we get ⊢ L lex 0 0 (θ ∧ ∀ψ) → 0 ϕ. By 4 0 , we have ⊢ L lex 0 (θ ∧ ∀ψ) → 0 0 (θ ∧ ∀ψ) and thus ⊢ L lex 0 (θ ∧ ∀ψ) → 0 ϕ. By the Pullout axiom, we have ⊢ L lex ( 0 θ ∧ ∀ψ) → 0 (θ ∧ ∀ψ). Hence ⊢ L lex ( 0 θ ∧ ∀ψ) → 0 ϕ. Therefore (( 0 θ ∧ ∀ψ) → 0 ϕ) ∈ T . As ( 0 θ) ∈ T and (∀ψ) ∈ T , by closure under modus ponens, we have 0 ϕ ∈ T . That is, T ∈ 0 ϕ . Given the Claim, there is a finite Γ 0 ⊆ Γ such that Γ 0 ⊢ L lex ⊥. By the theorem ⊢ L lex ∀(ψ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψ n ) ↔ (∀ψ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ∀ψ n ) we can assume that Γ 0 = {∀ψ, ¬ϕ} for some ψ ∈ T . Since Γ 0 ⊢ L lex ⊥ we have ⊢ L lex (∀ψ ∧ ¬ϕ) → ⊥, so by propositional logic ⊢ L lex (∀ψ) → (¬ϕ → ⊥), i.e., ⊢ L lex (∀ψ) → (¬¬ϕ), i.e., ⊢ L lex (∀ψ) → ϕ. By propositional logic, given ⊢ L lex (∀ψ) → ϕ we can strengthen the antecedent getting ⊢ L lex ( 0 ⊤ ∧ ∀ψ) → ϕ. Given the Pullout axiom ↔ , we have ⊢ L lex 0 (⊤ ∧ ∀ψ) ↔ ( 0 ⊤ ∧ ∀ψ) and thus ⊢ L lex 0 (⊤ ∧ ∀ψ) → ϕ. By the Monotonicity Rule for 0 , we get ⊢ L lex 0 0 (⊤ ∧ ∀ψ) → 0 ϕ. By 4 0 , we have ⊢ L lex 0 (⊤ ∧ ∀ψ) → 0 0 (⊤ ∧ ∀ψ) and thus ⊢ L lex 0 (⊤ ∧ ∀ψ) → 0 ϕ. By the Pullout axiom ↔ , we have ⊢ L lex ( 0 ⊤ ∧ ∀ψ) ↔ 0 (⊤ ∧ ∀ψ). Hence ⊢ L lex ( 0 ⊤ ∧ ∀ψ) → 0 ϕ. Therefore (( 0 ⊤ ∧ ∀ψ) → 0 ϕ) ∈ T . As 0 ⊤ is an axiom of our system, we have ( 0 ⊤) ∈ T and (∀ψ) ∈ T . Hence by closure under modus ponens, we have
Lemma 5 (Truth Lemma). For every ϕ ∈ L , we have:
Proof. The proof is by induction on the complexity of ϕ. The base case follows from the definition of V c . For the inductive case, suppose that for all T ∈ W c and all formulas ψ of lower complexity than ϕ, we have ψ M c = ψ . The Boolean cases where ϕ = ¬ψ and ϕ = ψ 1 ∧ψ 2 follow from the induction hypothesis together with the standard facts about maximal consistent theories included in proposition 1. Only the modalities remain. Let ϕ = ∃ψ and consider any T ∈ M c . We have
Lemma 6. L lex is strongly complete with respect to the class of pre-models (and hence it is also complete with respect to REL models).
Proof. It suffices to show that every L lex -consistent set of formulas is satisfiable on some lex model. Let Γ be an L lex -consistent set of formulas. By Lindenbaums Lemma, there is a maximally consistent set T 0 such that Γ ⊆ T 0 . Choose any canonical pre-model M c for T 0 . By Lemma 5:
Step 2: Unravelling the canonical pre-model
Next, we will unravel the canonical pre-model. We first fix some preliminary notions. First, define a set of "evidential indices"
where l is a symbol for "left" copy and r is a symbol for "right" copy. We use ǫ, ǫ ′ as metavariables ranging over evidential indices in I. To each ǫ ∈ I, we associate a corresponding relation R ǫ on the canonical model W c , as follows: R 0ϕ and R are as before (the relations in the canonical pre-model), and R (ϕ,l) = R (ϕ,r) := {(T, S) | S = F (T, ϕ)}.
Definition 39 (Histories). Let
The set of histories rooted at T 0 is the following set of finite sequences:
The setW forms the set of worlds of the unravelled tree.
Basically, histories record all finite sequences of worlds in M c starting with T 0 and passing to R ǫ -successors at each step, where ǫ ∈ I.
Definition 40 (β). We denote by β :W → W c the map returning the last theory in each history, i.e. β(T 0 , ǫ 1 , T 1 , ǫ 2 , . . . , ǫ n , T n ) := T n for all histories inW .
We now define the relations that will feature in the unravelling of M c around T 0 .
Definition 41 (→ ǫ relations). For a history w = (T 0 , ǫ 1 , T 1 , ǫ 2 , . . . , ǫ n , T n ) ∈W , we denote by (w, ǫ, T ) := (T 0 , ǫ 1 , T 1 , ǫ 2 , . . . , ǫ n , T n , ǫ, T ) the history obtained by extending the history w with the sequence (ǫ, T ) (where T ∈ W c ). Using this notation, we define the following relations → ǫ overW , labelled by indices in I:
We now define the unravelled tree for T 0 .
Definition 42 (Unravelled tree).
In the tree unravelling, one history has another history accessible if the second is one step longer than the first. The valuation on histories is copied from that on their last nodes. We now define paths on this tree of histories.
Definition 43 (R-path). Let w, w ′ ∈W and let R ⊆ {→ ǫ | ǫ ∈ I}. An R-path from w to w ′ is a finite sequence p = (w 0 , ǫ 1 , w 1 , ǫ 2 , . . . , ǫ n−1 , w n )
where w 0 = w, w n = w ′ , w k ∈W for k = 1, 2, . . . , n, ǫ k ∈ I for k = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1 and w k → ǫ k w k+1 for k = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1. For an R-path p = (w 0 , ǫ 1 , w 1 , ǫ 2 , . . . , ǫ n−1 , w n ) from w to w ′ , we denote by (p, ǫ, w ′′ ) := (w 0 , ǫ 1 , w 1 , ǫ 2 , . . . , ǫ n−1 , w n , ǫ, w ′′ ) the path obtained by extending the path p with (ǫ, w ′′ ). If R is not specified, we speak of a path. For any path p = (w 0 , ǫ 1 , w 1 , ǫ 2 , . . . , ǫ n−1 , w n ) we define f irst(p) = w 0 and last(p) = w n .
The following is a standard results about (unravelled) trees, which we will refer to later on.
Lemma 7 (Uniqueness of paths). LetK be the unravelling of M c around T 0 . Let w, w ′ ∈W and R ⊆ {→ ǫ | ǫ ∈ I}. Then, there is at most one R-path p from w to w ′ .
Step 3: Completeness with respect to lex-models
Step 2 unravelled the canonical pre-model from step 1. Using the structure from the unravelled tree, we now define a REL modelM from it. We then show that this model is in fact a lex-model. Finally, we define a variant of a bounded morphism defined for REL models, which we call bounded aggregation-morphism. Bounded aggregation-morphisms work on REL models in the same way as standard bounded-morphisms do on Kripke models: for REL models, modal satisfaction is invariant under bounded aggregation-morphisms. We then show that M c is a bounded-morphic image ofM , which gives us completeness. We first define the modelM .
Definition 44 (M ). LetK be the unravelling of M c around T 0 . The structureM = W , R ,˜ ,Ṽ ,Ãg has:R Proof. Reflexivity and transitivity follow immediately from the fact that each R ∈R \ {W ×W } is the reflexive transitive closure of some other relation, andW ×W is reflexive and transitive. Hence we just need to show the anti-symmetry of the relations. Let R ∈R \ {W ×W } and suppose Rwv and Rvw. First, we consider the case R =R 0ϕ for some ϕ such that ∃ 0 ϕ ∈ T 0 . I.e. R = (→ 0 ϕ ) * . Given Rwv there is some n ≥ 0 such that:
Similarly, given Rvw there is some m ≥ 0 such that:
for some T 2 ∈ W c , and proceeding in this way we get
Similarly, we have
for some T ′ 2 ∈ W c , and proceeding in this way we get
Hence we must have n = m = 0. For otherwise, substituting v in 2 with the expression in 1 we get w = (w, 0 ϕ, T 1 , 0 ϕ, T 2 , . . . , 0 ϕ, T n , v, 0 ϕ, T ′ 1 , 0 ϕ, T ′ 2 , . . . , 0 ϕ, T ′ m ) for n > 0 or m > 0 which is impossible. Therefore w = w 0 = w n = v, as required.
Now we consider the case
Given Rwv there is some n ≥ 0 such that:
Reasoning as we did in the case of R =R 0ϕ , we conclude that m = n = 0 and hence w = v. The case of R = R ′ r is analogous to the one just discussed, and we are done.
Proposition 4. InM we have:
Hence, there is some n ≥ 0 such that:
Hence, there is some m ≥ 0 such that:
By definition of → i k , we have w 1 = (w, i 0 , T 1 ) for some T 1 ∈ W c , w 2 = (w, i 0 , T 1 , i 1 , T 2 ) for some T 2 ∈ W c , and proceeding in this way we get
Reasoning in a similar way, we get
where T ′ i ∈ W c and j k ∈ { } ∪ {(ϕ, r) | ϕ ∈ L }, for k = 1, . . . , m − 1.
Given the expressions 3 and 4, we have w n = v = w ′ m . Hence n = m and for all k < n, i k = j k . Hence we must have i k = = j k for all k < n. This means that the path
can be rewritten as w = w 0 → w 1 → · · · → w n = v which is an { }-path from w to v. Hence (w, v) ∈R = (→ ) * .
(⊇) Let (w, v) ∈R = (→ ) * . Then there is some n ≥ 0 such that:
The { }-path described above is also an
Proposition 5.M is a lex model.
Proof. To establish thatM is a lex model, we need to show that it meets the condition of a REL model and thatÃg = lex. That is, we have to show:
1.R is a family of evidence, i.e., every R ∈R is a preorder.
Proof. By induction on the structure of ϕ. The base case holds by the valuation condition. The boolean cases are shown by unfolding the definitions, so we consider the cases involving modalities.
Suppose M, w |= ♦ 0 ψ. Then for all R ∈ R there is some v ∈ W such that Rwv and M, v |= ψ. Now we want to show:
Let R ∈ R be arbitrary. By the forth condition 2(a), there exists some
By induction hypothesis, given M ′ , f (u) |= ψ we get M, u |= ψ. As R was arbitrarily picked, this holds for all relations in R. Hence we have M, w |= ⋄ 0 ψ.
)wv and f (v) = v ′ . By induction hypothesis, we get M, v |= ψ. Hence M, w |= ♦ψ. Proof. We need to check that β satisfies the conditions of a surjective bounded aggregationmorphism.
1. Surjectivity: Let T ∈ W c be arbitrary. We need to show that there is some h ∈W such that β(h) = T . Recall that we showed in 2.2. that W c × W c = R 0⊤ ∈ R . Hence R 0⊤ T 0 T . Thus the history h = (T 0 , 0 ⊤, T ) is an element ofW with β(h) = T , as required. 2. Valuation condition. This follows from the definition ofṼ .
Forth conditions:
(a) We need to show that for all R ∈R, for all w ∈W , there exists some
i.e., R 0ϕ β(w)T . We will show that T ∈ {β(v) |R 0ϕ wv}. Note that, given R 0ϕ β(w)T , the history w ′ = (w, 0 ϕ, T ) is inW . This means that w → 0 ϕ w ′ . Hence (→ 0ϕ ) * ww ′ , i.e.,R 0ϕ ww ′ . Given β(w ′ ) = T , we get T ∈ {β(v) |R 0ϕ wv}, as required.
Given R ′ β(w)T , for some n ≥ 0, there is a path:
Hence there are histories w 1 = (w, ǫ 0 , S 1 ), w 2 = (w, ǫ 0 , S 1 , ǫ 1 , S 2 ), up to w n = (w, ǫ 0 , S 1 , ǫ 1 , S 2 , . . . , ǫ n−1 , T ). Hence, by definition of → ǫ k , for each k < n, we have w k → ǫ k w k+1 . Hence there is a path
The case of R = R ′ r is analogous to the one above. Hence we have left the case R =W ×W .
As β is surjective, we know that there is some u ∈W such that β(u) = T , and we are done.
Let w, v ∈W be arbitrary and suppose thatÃg( R ,˜ )wv. By proposition 5.3, giveñ Ag( R ,˜ )wv we haveR wv, i.e., (→ ) * wv. Hence, for some n ≥ 0, there is a path:
Hence there are histories w 1 = (w, , S 1 ), w 2 = (w, , S 1 , , S 2 ), up to w n = v = (w, , S 1 , , S 2 , . . . , , S n ). Hence by definition of w n we have 
. Take any β(u) ∈ {β(v) |R 0ϕ wv}. We haveR 0ϕ wu, i.e., (→ 0 ϕ ) * wu. Hence for some n ≥ 0, there is a path:
where w i ∈W , for k ≤ n. Hence there are histories w 1 = (w, 0 ϕ, S 1 ), w 2 = (w, 0 ϕ, S 1 , 0 ϕ, S 2 ), up to w n = u = (w, 0 ϕ, S 1 , 0 ϕ, S 2 , . . . , 0 ϕ, S n ). Hence, by definition of w n , we have β(w)R 0 S 1 R 0 , . . . , R 0 β(u)
And since R 0 is transitive, we get R 0 β(w)β(u), as required.
We have R ′ l wu, i.e., (→ ∪ {→ (ϕ,l) | ϕ ∈ L }) * wu. Hence for some n ≥ 0, there is a path:
Hence, by definition of w n , we have a path β(w)R ǫ0 S 1 R ǫ1 S 2 , . . . , R ǫn−1 β(u)
Since R ′ = (R ∪ {R (ϕ,l) }) * , the path above is a path from β(w) to β(u) along R ′ , i.e., we have R ′ β(w)β(u), as required. 
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
We recall the theorem:
We prove the soundness and completeness of L ! , L + and L ⇑ separately.
Soundness and completeness of L ! .
Claim. L ! is sound w.r.t. ∩-models.
Proof. A straighforward validity check.
Claim. L ! is complete w.r.t ∩-models.
Proof. The proof is standard, following the approach presented, e.g., in [21] , Chapter 7.
Soundness and completeness of L + . As before, we first consider soundness.
Claim. L + is sound w.r.t ∩-models.
Proof. Let M = W, R, V, Ag ∩ be a ∩-model, w a world in M , π be an evidence program with normal form s∈S0(I) (?s(ϕ, ψ); A; ?ψ s len(s) ) ∪ (?⊤).
1. Axiom EA4 ∩ : We first prove the following: Given the Claim, we have: 2. Axiom EA5 ∩ : We first prove the following: 
Reasoning as we did in the proof of EA4 ∩ , we get Given the Claim, we have
(s(ϕ, ψ) → (ψs len(s) → [+π]χ)) ( by the Claim above))
3. Axiom EA6 ∩ :
Claim. L + is complete with respect to the class of ∩-models.
Proof. The proof follows the approach presented above for L ! .
Soundness and completeness of L ⇑ As before, we first consider soundness. Before proving the main claim, we introduce a lemma about the formulas occurring in the reduction axioms. 
Now take any u such that (w, u) ∈ R ∩ π M . If we show that u ∈ [⇑ π]χ M , we are done. Note first that given M, w |= π ∩ (χ), we have M, w |= [⇑ π]χ, so if w = u we are done. Suppose w = u.
As (w, u) ∈ R ∩ π M , we have (w, u) ∈ π M . Note that Thus, we have M, w |= s ⋆ (ϕ, ψ) and hence M, u |= ∃(s ⋆ (ϕ, ψ)). Recall that
Hence M, w |= ϕ Consider R and take any v such that Rwv. We need to show that
Suppose that M, v |= Claim. L ⇑ is complete w.r.t. ∩-models.
Proof. The follows the same steps used to prove completeness of L ! .
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
We first introduce some lemmas. During our discussion of evidence upgrade in ∩-models, we showed in Lemma 8 that [⇑ π]χ ∧ π < (χ) is true at a state w in a ∩-model M if [⇑ π]χ is true at w and π < M [w] ⊆ [⊕π]χ M . It is easy to see that, since the formula π < (χ) contains no occurrences of (only ∀), the result transfers to lex models, as the semantics of ∀ is the same in all REL models. Hence we have: We now introduce another lemma which will be useful in the proof of the reduction axioms. Proof. Straightforward.
We now show one more lemma, before presenting the proof system L + lex . With these lemmas in place, the proofs of the validity of the reduction axioms in this system will be almost immediate. We now turn to the main soundness claim.
Claim. L ⊕ is sound w.r.t. lex-models.
Proof. Let M = W, R, , V, lex , w a world in M , π be an evidence program with normal form s∈S0(I) (?s(ϕ, ψ); A; ?ψ s len(s) ) ∪ (?⊤).
1. Axiom ⊕EA4: Note that this same axiom was called EA4 ∩ in the system L + ∩ for ∩-models. The effects on evidence possession (as expressed by 0 -formulas) of evidence addition in ∩-models are the same as the effects of prioritized evidence addition in lex models; in both cases, the piece of evidence π M is added to the initial body of evidence R. Thus, it is easy to see that the proof of the validity of EA4 ∩ in ∩-models can be straightforwardly adapted to show the validity of ⊕EA4 in lex models. Proof. The proof follows the same steps used above to prove completeness for other proof systems with dynamic modalities.
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
The soundness proof is straighforward. We focus on completeness. The proof is based on the the completeness-via-canonicity approach. In particular, we construct of a canonical REL model for each L c -consistent theory T 0 . This model is almost identical to the pre-model used in the completeness proof for L lex . 
